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PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION:  
TOTALITY TESTS OR RIGID RULES? 
KIT KINPORTS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its decision more than thirty years ago in Illinois v. Gates,1 the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion 
requirements—the probable cause required to arrest and search, the reasonable 
suspicion needed to stop and frisk—are totality-of-the-circumstances tests. 
Gates overturned Supreme Court precedent that had held for nearly two 
decades that a tip did not give rise to probable cause absent evidence that 
the informant both (1) was honest and (2) had a reliable basis for her 
information.2 Rejecting this “rigid” two-part test, the Gates Court stressed 
that probable cause is a “fluid,” “practical, common-sense” concept that is 
“not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”3 
The Court has used similar language to explain the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis applied when measuring the lower quantum of proof 
necessary to create reasonable suspicion.4 With the exception of one 
outlier—Illinois v. Wardlow, which articulated the sweeping rule that 
“[h]eadlong flight” in a “high crime area” constitutes reasonable suspicion5—
 
† Professor of Law and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State University 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
2 Id. at 228-39 (overturning Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)). 
3 Id. at 231-32, 238. 
4 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (observing that “the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account”). 
5 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
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the Court has repeatedly recited the common-sense, totality-of-the-circumstances 
mantra when defining both probable cause and reasonable suspicion.6 
In two recent opinions, however, the Court has strayed from this path, 
leaning towards reliance on bright-line rules to define probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion. Perhaps not surprisingly, these deviations have come 
in cases where a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is more likely to 
favor criminal defendants. And both times, the tests that have emerged 
from the Court’s rulings have tended to oversimplify by exaggerating the 
reliability of the information used by the police. 
I. THE ROAD TO NAVARETTE 
In the first case, Florida v. Harris, a unanimous Supreme Court held, in 
essence, that a positive alert by a certified or recently trained narcotics-detection 
dog creates probable cause to search.7 In so doing, the Court exhibited 
overconfidence in the accuracy of drug dogs and glossed over questions about 
their reliability.8 The Court claimed that its opinion called for an examination 
of “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert,” just like “every inquiry into 
probable cause.”9 But that assertion was presumably based on the Court’s 
caveat that defendants must be given an opportunity to present “conflicting 
evidence”—either by cross-examining the dog’s handler or presenting their 
own witnesses at the suppression hearing.10 
As I have previously argued, this proviso does not give defendants a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the prosecution’s probable cause showing, 
because defense counsel is unlikely to have access to the critical information 
about a dog’s training and field performance needed to mount a credible 
challenge to its reliability.11 For all practical purposes, then, Harris resembles 
a bright-line test, like the rules Gates and its progeny avoided, and not the 
“more flexible, all-things-considered approach” the Harris Court purported 
to use.12 
 
6 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003); Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996). 
7 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). 
8 See Kit Kinports, The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 64, 67 (2013) (“Though the scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs is still 
developing, research has shown that a significant percentage of positive alerts do not lead to the 
discovery of narcotics.” (footnotes omitted)). 
9 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. 
10 Id. at 1057. 
11 Kinports, supra note 8, at 65-66. 
12 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56. 
8 Kinports Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  9/15/2014 7:52 PM 
2014] PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 77 
This trend continued, though somewhat less blatantly, with last Term’s 
opinion in Navarette v. California.13 The question on which the Court 
granted certiorari was whether the Fourth Amendment “require[s] an 
officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless 
driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.”14 
The stage for Navarette was set in Florida v. J.L., where the Court 
unanimously held that an anonymous tip claiming that a certain individual 
is carrying a weapon does not, “without more,” create the reasonable 
suspicion necessary for a Terry stop and frisk.15 Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion in that case concluded that an anonymous call, which reported that 
a young African-American male wearing a plaid shirt was at a bus stop and 
in possession of a weapon, lacked the requisite “indicia of reliability” to give 
rise to reasonable suspicion.16 Although the police were able to corroborate 
that someone matching the caller’s description was at the designated bus 
stop, the Court explained that reasonable suspicion mandates that “a tip be 
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a 
determinate person.”17 
The J.L. Court thus distinguished Alabama v. White,18 an earlier decision 
involving an anonymous phone call that accused a woman of possessing 
cocaine. The White Court had characterized that case as a “close” one and 
cautioned that the tip alone was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.19 
But the majority ultimately found that the police were justified in conducting 
a Terry stop, once they were able to corroborate that the informant had 
correctly predicted the woman would leave a particular apartment complex 
at a specified time and had accurately described the vehicle she was driving 
and the direction in which she was heading.20 Notably, the White Court did 
not consider the description of the woman’s vehicle to be particularly 
significant, given that “[a]nyone could have ‘predicted’ that fact because it 
was a condition presumably existing at the time of the call.”21 Nevertheless, 
the informant’s “ability to predict [White’s] future behavior”—something 
“[t]he general public would have no way of knowing”—suggested that the 
 
13 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
14 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). 
15 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000) (interpreting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which established 
the legal standards for stops and frisks). 
16 Id. at 271. 
17 Id. at 272. 
18 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
19 Id. at 329, 332; see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (calling White a “borderline” case). 
20 White, 496 U.S. at 331-32. 
21 Id. at 332. 
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informant had “inside information” and therefore made it “likely” that the 
caller also had “access to reliable information about [White’s] illegal activities.”22 
When J.L. distinguished White ten years later, the Court recognized the 
dangers associated with weapons, but refused to create a “firearm exception” 
to the traditional standards governing reasonable suspicion.23 Nevertheless, 
the J.L. Court admonished that “extraordinary dangers sometimes justify 
unusual precautions” and declined to “speculate” whether other circumstances—
such as an anonymous tip concerning a bomb—might present a “danger . . . 
so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability.”24 
Picking up on that dictum, a number of lower courts began to endorse a 
drunk-driving exception that allowed the police to stop a vehicle based 
solely on an anonymous tip.25 The issue attracted the Supreme Court’s 
attention in 2009, when Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case involving the validity of a 
drunk-driving stop.26 The two Justices hinted strongly that they disapproved 
of the lower court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion demanded that a 
law enforcement official personally witness erratic driving: they reasoned 
that drunk driving generates more immediate risks than the concealed 
weapon in J.L., and that requiring the police to give intoxicated drivers “one 
free swerve” may lead to a fatal accident.27 
II. THE RULING IN NAVARETTE 
When the same question returned to the Court last Term in Navarette, 
the majority ultimately purported to duck it by holding only that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion of drunk 
driving on the facts of the case.28 (Interestingly, this ruling seems more 
responsive to the second issue raised in the petition for certioari,29 a more 
 
22 Id. But see id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that many commuters leave home at 
the same time and travel in a certain direction on a daily basis). 
23 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 
24 Id. at 272-73. 
25 See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 n.2 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (citing an opinion from the Eighth Circuit and nine state supreme court decisions). 
26 Id. at 10. 
27 Id. at 12. 
28 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 1692 (2014). 
29 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (“Does 
an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road provide reasonable suspicion to 
stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless 
driver, and the officer could not corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect 
vehicle for several miles?”). 
8 Kinports Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  9/15/2014 7:52 PM 
2014] PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION 79 
fact-specific question which the Court declined to review.)30 But, as noted 
in the dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, “[b]e not deceived.”31 Notwithstanding the majority’s 
assertion, Navarette, like the prior Term’s drug-dog ruling in Florida v. 
Harris, is likely to have the practical effect of creating a bright-line rule: that 
reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises whenever an informant claims 
to have witnessed even a single instance of certain risky driving behaviors. 
And, like Harris, this test tends to oversimplify by exaggerating the reliability 
of the information in the hands of the police, a misstep that will only prove 
more damaging if the lower courts later take steps to further dilute the rule. 
The anonymous tip in Navarette was a 911 call claiming that the driver of 
a silver Ford 150 pickup truck had run the informant off an undivided two-lane 
road five minutes earlier.32 The caller provided the truck’s license number, 
location, and direction of travel.33 Approximately eighteen minutes after the 
reported incident, the police located the truck nineteen miles up the road.34 
An officer followed the vehicle for approximately five minutes without 
observing any traffic violations or erratic driving, then pulled the truck 
over.35 The police smelled marijuana surrounding the vehicle and ultimately 
discovered thirty pounds of that drug in the truck.36 
In initially finding sufficient “indicia of reliability” to allow the police 
“to credit the caller’s account,” Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority 
relied on three factors.37 First, the caller was an actual witness to the 
dangerous driving behavior and thus had a credible basis for her information.38 
Second, the tip was relatively contemporaneous, enhancing its reliability.39 
Finally, 911 tips are less likely to be fraudulent because today’s 911 system 
permits law enforcement to record calls and identify a caller’s phone 
number and location, thereby preventing dishonest informants from relying 
on their anonymity.40 
 
30 See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting review on only the first question 
presented in the petition for certiorari). 
31 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the lineup in Navarette may 
seem somewhat strange, Justice Scalia has increasingly joined forces with the three more liberal 
female Justices in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 
(2013); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013). 
32 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686-87. 
33 Id. at 1686. 
34 See id. at 1687. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1688. 
38 Id. at 1689. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1689-90. 
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The majority next concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion 
that the driver of the truck was intoxicated because the tip involved “more 
than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of 
drunk or reckless driving.”41 The Court reasoned that, like weaving and 
driving in the wrong lane (and unlike seatbelt and minor speeding violations), 
running another car off the road is a form of “erratic behavior[] . . . strongly 
correlated with drunk driving” and not merely “an isolated example of 
recklessness.”42 Additionally, the Court rejected the Petitioners’ argument 
that reasonable suspicion was undermined by the police officer’s inability to 
corroborate any dangerous driving even after following the truck for five 
minutes. Rather, the Court found it “hardly surprising that the appearance 
of a marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a time.”43 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NAVARETTE 
Rather than picking up on J.L.’s dictum and expressly recognizing a 
“drunk driving exception” to the usual standards governing reasonable 
suspicion, the Navarette Court distinguished J.L. on the grounds that the tip 
in Navarette was supported by “stronger” evidence of reliability.44 The 
Court likewise devoted little attention to the State of California’s primary 
contentions that driving while intoxicated is a peculiarly dangerous crime 
(creating a “grave and imminent threat” compared to the “inchoate risk” 
present in J.L.) and that the severity of the crime is a relevant factor to be 
balanced in assessing reasonable suspicion.45 The majority’s sole reference to 
the dangers of drunk driving came towards the end of its opinion, where 
Justice Thomas mentioned that Navarette would be a “particularly 
inappropriate” vehicle for deviating from the standard doctrine that police 
may conduct a stop as soon as they have reasonable suspicion, because 
 
41 Id. at 1691. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. But see id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “no mere act of the will can 
resist” the effects of intoxication on driving). 
44 Id. at 1692 (majority opinion).; cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013) (plurality 
opinion) (refusing to recognize a per se exigency in drunk driving cases because, although the 
crime “exact[s] a terrible toll . . . the general importance of the government’s interest . . . does not 
justify departing from” the standard approach to the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement). 
45 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 30-32, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); see 
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-21, Navarette, 134 
S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (taking a similar position). 
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“allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have 
disastrous consequences.”46 
The Court wisely chose not to venture down the path suggested by the 
State. A number of Fourth Amendment scholars have advocated a similar 
sliding-scale approach, with the requisite quantum of proof varying based 
on not only the gravity of the crime, but also factors such as the intrusiveness 
of the police action and the immediacy of the need for police intervention.47 
But the Court has steered clear of this amorphous, ad hoc approach, which 
“could only produce more slide than scale.”48 The Court has never envisioned 
that judges would conduct a balancing test or apply differing definitions of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion based on the severity of the crime.49 
Thus, the briefs filed by the State and the federal government in 
Navarette were forced to resort to irrelevant Supreme Court precedent.50 
They cited cases like Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court balanced the competing 
interests at stake in deciding “as a general proposition” that the Fourth 
Amendment allows certain exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements.51 The briefs also relied on opinions that applied a balancing 
 
46 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691-92. 
47 See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. 
L.J. 279, 323 (2004) (advocating that “the fiction of one uniform definition of probable cause . . . 
be replaced with a flexible sliding scale that takes into account the severity of the intrusion and the 
magnitude of the threat”); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
951, 1014 (2003) (proposing “a reasonableness framework for analyzing questions of probable cause 
that draws upon Learned Hand’s test for evaluating claims of negligence”); Christopher Slobogin, 
The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 609 (2007) (criticizing 
the “unitary probable cause standard”). 
48 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 (1974). 
49 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (noting that “[t]he ‘long-prevailing 
standards’ of probable cause embodied ‘the best compromise’” of competing interests, and 
therefore “[this] standard [of probable cause] applied to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ 
the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations” (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))). 
50 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 10-12, 26-28, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-
9490); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-26, Navarette, 
134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). 
51 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 
187-88 (2004) (upholding a state statute that required suspects to disclose their names during Terry 
stops); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303-06 (1999) (extending the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement to searches of passengers’ belongings); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
386, 392-93 (1985) (allowing warrantless searches of automobiles when “the overriding standard of 
probable cause is met”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1985) (permitting Terry 
stops to investigate past felony offenses); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-06 (1983) 
(authorizing the brief detention of luggage at airports based on reasonable suspicion). 
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test in assessing the constitutionality of administrative inspection programs,52 
as well as cases considering the severity of the threat posed by a defendant 
when evaluating the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of force.53 On 
none of these occasions, however, did the Court use a balancing test to 
determine whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed on a 
given set of facts.54 
In a few isolated circumstances, the Court has inexplicably chosen to 
resolve a Fourth Amendment case by using a free-wheeling balancing test—
on the theory that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”55 Those decisions, however, 
were limited to permitting certain searches on the understanding that 
reasonable suspicion already existed or was not required.56 Admittedly, the 
most recent of those opinions, Maryland v. King, purported to restrict DNA 
testing to suspects who had been arrested for “a serious offense.”57 But the 
Court’s recitation of the government interests served by identifying 
arrestees through DNA tests had little to do with the gravity of the crime of 
arrest.58 In fact, the majority repeatedly mentioned the importance of 
ascertaining whether someone detained for a minor offense had a violent 
criminal history.59 This reasoning prompted the dissenters to observe that 
“an entirely predictable consequence” of the Court’s ruling is to allow DNA 
testing of all arrestees because no “principle could possibly justify” confining 
the holding to serious crimes.60 
 
52 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (allowing sobriety roadblocks); 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) (permitting body-cavity inspections of pretrial detainees); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-63 (1976) (upholding immigration checkpoints). 
53 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383-84 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). 
54 See Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 649, 655 (2009) (noting that Terry and its progeny did not anticipate the use of a balancing test 
to analyze the existence of reasonable suspicion). 
55 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958, 1969-70 (2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001). 
56 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (allowing DNA testing of suspects arrested for “serious 
offense[s]”); Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (upholding state statute authorizing suspicionless searches of 
parolees); Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22 (permitting searches of a probationer’s person and property 
based on reasonable suspicion). 
57 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
58 See id. at 1970-75 (citing the government interests in determining the arrestee’s identity, 
preventing harm to jailhouse staff and detainees, guaranteeing the defendant’s presence at trial, 
assisting in bail decisions, and exonerating innocent persons). 
59 See id. at 1971-74. 
60 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, there is no precedent in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
for applying a balancing approach or considering the severity of the crime 
when assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Any move towards a 
sliding-scale approach would create intractable line-drawing problems, for, 
as Justice Kagan observed during oral argument in Navarette, “all crime 
represents a threat to public safety.”61 
The Navarette majority not only declined to create a drunk-driving 
exception to the standards governing reasonable suspicion, but also refused 
to explicitly endorse the rigid rules advocated by the State of California and 
the federal government. Both of them claimed that their views were 
consistent with the Court’s traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,62 
and, ironically, even accused the Petitioners of deviating from that approach 
by calling for police corroboration of anonymous tips.63 In fact, however, 
both the State and the Solicitor General actually proposed sweeping rules. 
The State argued that reasonable suspicion arises whenever an anonymous 
911 call “report[s] the caller’s personal observation of drunk or reckless 
driving and provid[es] a detailed description of the vehicle, its location, and 
direction of travel” and the police find a vehicle matching that description 
in the vicinity.64 The Solicitor General urged the Court to articulate an 
even broader version of this rule, which would not require the informant to 
specify that she had personally witnessed any erratic driving.65 The Solicitor 
General defended this position on the ground that a “description of the 
 
61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-
9490); see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has not 
recognized exceptions to probable cause and reasonable suspicion even to “prevent and detect 
murder”); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272-73 (2000) (warning that a weapons exception to the 
reasonable suspicion requirement could not be “securely confine[d],” thereby “allowing the 
exception to swallow the rule”). 
62 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 24-25, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28-29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 
1683 (No. 12-9490). 
63 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 33, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (arguing 
that Petitioners “fail[ed] to consider the differences between tips reporting possessory offenses and 
those reporting observation of drunk driving”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (asserting that Petitioners 
would “mak[e] future predictions the sole acceptable index of reliability in cases where officers do 
not witness criminal activity themselves”). 
64 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 24, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). 
65 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12, Navarette, 
134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (arguing that law enforcement officials have reasonable suspicion 
when “an anonymous 911 call report[s] reckless or drunken driving” and they “corroborate the 
location and description of the vehicle”). 
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details of a reckless or drunken driving episode . . . supports an inference 
that the caller’s basis of knowledge is eyewitness observation.”66 
Although the Navarette dissenters accused the majority of adopting the 
views of the Solicitor General,67 that claim is something of an overstatement. 
As noted above, the majority relied heavily on the proposition that the 911 
caller in Navarette was an actual eyewitness to the erratic driving.68 Just as 
in J.L., then, the Court rejected the federal government’s argument that 
reasonable suspicion arises whenever an anonymous tip “provides a description 
of a particular person at a particular location illegally carrying a concealed 
firearm” (or, in Navarette, driving under the influence) and “police promptly 
verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence of the firearm” 
(or, here, reckless driving behavior).69 
Whether the Court’s opinion in essence endorsed the rule advanced by 
the State is a closer question. Admittedly, the Court cited two factors 
beyond the test proposed by the State in reaching its initial conclusion that 
the 911 call contained sufficient indicia of reliability for the police to give it 
credence: (1) the timing of the tip and (2) law enforcement’s ability to trace 
911 calls.70 But those factors do not differentiate Navarette’s facts from most 
other cases involving anonymous tips. Even the information provided in 
J.L. was presumably contemporaneous given that the police found a young 
man matching the caller’s description when they arrived at the bus stop.71 
Moreover, caller ID is “widely available” to law enforcement generally, not 
just the 911 emergency system.72 As an officer informed Seth Rogen’s 
character in the film Neighbors, “We have caller ID, we’re cops, everybody 
has caller ID.”73 
Nevertheless, the second part of the Court’s analysis—which found that 
the tip in Navarette created reasonable suspicion of driving under the 
influence—does deviate from the State’s position. As explained above, the 
 
66 Id. 
67 See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority as finding 
the reasonable suspicion requirement satisfied whenever a 911 caller reports “a single instance of 
possibly careless or reckless driving,” “[s]o long as the caller identifies where the car is”). 
68 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
69 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 16, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993)). 
70 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
71 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268 (explaining that officers arrived at the bus stop six minutes after 
being dispatched, but noting that the record did not indicate how much time had elapsed since the 
phone call). 
72 See id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
73 Neighbors (I) (2014) Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2004420/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=
tt_trv_qu (last visited Sept. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9NK8-CKFM. 
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Court reasoned that driving another vehicle off the road is not merely “a 
conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving” or “an isolated example 
of recklessness.”74 The State, by contrast, took the view that reasonable 
suspicion can be based on a tip about “reckless driving,”75 which seems the 
paradigmatic illustration of a “conclusory allegation” of reckless driving. 
Moreover, as Justice Alito noted at oral argument, informants typically are 
not “able to say” a particular driver is drunk because “all they [can] observe 
is what they see.”76 
Thus, Orin Kerr correctly pointed out that the Court did not give the 
State “the bright-line rule that [it] really wanted.”77 The Court did not pick 
up on the J.L. dictum and decide that drunk driving poses such “extraordinary 
dangers”78 that the usual rules do not apply, and it did not defend the 
sweeping statement that reasonable suspicion arises whenever a 911 caller 
reports having observed drunk or reckless driving. But it is less clear that 
Professor Kerr was right to applaud the majority for deciding the case on 
“appropriately narrow grounds,” applying a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis rather than articulating a less extreme bright-line test.79 
In fact, it is not much of a stretch to read Navarette as announcing a rule 
that reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises from any anonymous tip 
that (1) describes a car and its location, (2) claims to have observed (3) a 
single incident of behavior like weaving between lanes, and (4) proves to be 
accurate with respect to the car and its location. There is nothing inherently 
objectionable about bright lines, though the Court can be criticized for 
selectively endorsing only those rules that tend to favor the prosecution. 
More problematic, however, is the fact that any further dilution of the 
second or third requirement effectively would give the State what it “really 
wanted” and runs counter to the unanimous ruling in J.L. 
The anonymous tip in J.L. was missing only the second of these four 
factors. It was, in the Court’s words, just “the bare report of an unknown, 
unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun 
nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.”80 
Thus, it was the Navarette caller’s personal observation that, like the 
 
74 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014); see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). 
76 Id. at 45. 
77 Orin Kerr, Six Thoughts on Navarette v. California, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 
22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/22/six-thoughts-on-
navarette-v-california, archived at http://perma.cc/7DW4-8P4X. 
78 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000). 
79 Kerr, supra note 77. 
80 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. 
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prediction of future behavior in Alabama v. White and Illinois v. Gates,81 
suggested she had a reliable basis for her information. Without evidence of the 
informant’s eyewitness status, the tip merely “tend[ed] to identify a determinate 
person,”82 providing the same type of information “[a]nyone could have” 
supplied,83 that the White Court considered unhelpful84 and the J.L. Court 
found inadequate.85 
Similarly, any expansion of the type of driving behavior that satisfies the 
third element of the Navarette rule increases the risk of targeting innocent 
activity. Even the conduct that the Court suggested can create reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving—swerving and weaving between lanes86—has a 
number of credible explanations other than intoxication. The driver may be 
trying to avoid hitting a pothole or an animal, checking on a child in the 
back seat, or changing the radio station.87 These alternative scenarios 
become even more plausible if the police are unable to verify anything other 
than impeccable driving over a five-minute period—especially given that 
concealing a weapon is easier than either masking a high blood-alcohol level 
or driving without committing some petty traffic violation. If courts allow 
vaguer observations or more minor infractions to satisfy this third element, 
the definition of reasonable suspicion emerging from Navarette becomes 
susceptible to even greater overinclusiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, notwithstanding its protestations, the Court’s recent rulings defining 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion have deviated from Gates and its 
progeny, creating drug-dog and drunk-driving exceptions to the totality-of-
 
81 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983). 
82 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 
83 White, 496 U.S. at 332; see also Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (pointing out that the description of the Petitioners’ vehicle and location conveyed 
“generally available” information that “everyone in the world who saw the car would have” and 
that “anyone who wanted the car stopped would have to provide”). 
84 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
86 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690-91. 
87 See id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Petitioners’ “truck might have swerved to 
avoid an animal, a pothole, or a jaywalking pedestrian”); Brief of National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers & National Association of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 14-15, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (observing that seemingly erratic 
driving could result from “momentary inattention while adjusting the radio, justifiable distraction 
from a dangerous insect, swerving quickly to miss an animal running onto the road, and a flat tire 
or other car trouble”). 
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the-circumstances approach. Florida v. Harris has the practical effect of 
adopting the sweeping rule that a positive alert by a certified or recently 
trained drug dog gives rise to probable cause. Navarette v. California essentially 
articulated a rigid test that reasonable suspicion of driving under the 
influence arises whenever an anonymous informant reports having observed 
even one instance of certain reckless driving behaviors. In both decisions, 
the Court exhibited overconfidence in the reliability of narcotics dogs and 
911 callers. The Court’s miscalculation threatens to become even more 
problematic if, in the wake of Navarette, courts loosely interpret the requirement 
that informants must assert eyewitness status or expand the types of careless 
driving behaviors allowed to create reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. 
Any such extension of Navarette would lead to an even broader bright-line 
rule that runs directly counter to J.L. and effectively endorses a drunk-driving 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion requirements. 
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